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In his great history of Christian doctrine Jaroslav Pelikan placed a decisive break in Christian 
thought not at the sixteenth-century Reformation but at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century.1 As Pelikan’s division suggests Protestants and Catholics of the sixteenth century 
shared more assumptions than enlightenment thinkers would with their predecessors in 
either camp. 
 
Born in 1703 Jonathan Edwards stands at the head of this division. A man who embodies the 
end of the Puritan tradition in America and the start of the those who sought to restate their 
faith in the new language of enlightenment thought. At this time tension between those who 
wished to embrace the new learning and those who wished to retain the old is seen in the 
formation of Yale College2, the college which Edwards would attend. The purpose of the 
college was to provide a traditional Puritan education founded by those who felt that 
Harvard’s contemporary curriculum had slipped from traditional standards. Edwards 
entered Yale in 1716 only for the whole college to be disbanded for a period of three years 
during which time he was tutored by Elisha Williams, a congregational minister. When the 
college came back together in 1719 it had as its rector a Harvard graduate Timothy Cutler. 
The significance of this fact is that Yale college became increasingly open to the thought of 
Locke, Malebranche, Newton, et al. Returning to Yale as a tutor between 1724-1726 gave 
Edwards plenty of opportunity to explore the library and to digest contemporary thought. It 
was this mixture of a conservative Puritan upbringing alongside exposure to new thought 
that Edwards’ brought together in his thinking. George Marsden summarises: “Much ink has 
been spilled on whether Edwards was essentially a medieval or a modern. The answer is that 
he was both...Caught between two eras and determinedly and sometimes brilliantly trying to 
reconcile the two”3 
 
It is precisely in this grappling with two worlds that Edwards can provide stimulus for our 
thinking today. As a theologian of his times Edwards’ rejected the mechanistic rationalism of 
the deists. But in so doing he didn’t retreat to old formulae, rather, he took his tradition and 
expounded it in a way that spoke within the intellectual milieu of his time whilst upholding 
traditional doctrine. In his vehement opposition to the mechanistic scheme of deism 
Edwards expounded an idealist metaphysic in which he saw everything as relying directly, 
second by second, upon God. God could not be seen as a distant creator who set things in 
motion, he must be imminent. In fact, for Edwards God’s immanence was such that 
everything that existed must, in order to exist, exist inside God (panentheism). Going so far 
as to define God as the only “true” cause since he is the only being ever present who 
necessitates what he wills, and is sufficient to produce his willed effects. This leads him to his 
well-known doctrine of continuous creation: 
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“All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; 
renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that 
shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun”4 
 
Edwards view of reality is more than simple speculation. It was a complete metaphysical 
reformulation which left no room for deism. This view of causes provided a defence of the 
traditional doctrine of providence but in a way that set in on new terms that met the needs of 
his times. 
 
In this essay we are not looking to explore Edwards opposition to deism but what it means to 
be human though, as an occasional theologian, much of his work is a response to particular 
issues. We are going to draw on his corpus, both constructive and polemical, asking him to 
speak to a question he never specifically addressed. His metaphysics, which provided the 
grounding for his apologetic work, is fundamental for all he has to say concerning the human 
person. 
 
Edwards’ panentheism for example, that is his desire to see everything as radically 
dependent on God moment by moment, led to the idea that the whole of creation was part of 
God’s self-communication. In his notebooks he wrote, “The great and universal end of God’s 
creating the world was to communicate himself. God is a communicative being”.5 Grounded 
in what seems to be abstract metaphysical speculation Edwards finds a doctrine with 
profound implications in the practical realm of ethics. For it means that the great purpose of 
all of creation, the meaning of life itself, is God’s self-communication. Further, this means 
that creation reflects the God it communicates or else it would not be able to communicate 
anything at all. 
 
Moving from his metaphysical grounding through to God’s end of self-communication in 
creation. Edwards developed his understanding of typology. Typology is a way of reading the 
Bible in which a story is understood to set for an example, or ‘type’, of what was to come. 
Edwards used typology both in this traditional sense but extended its application to produce 
a typology of nature in which the very fabric of the universe spoke of its creator. His 
inherited reformed tradition had always understood typology, that is the first type, not only 
to be valid but a key part of Old Testament exegesis. Type antitype relationships between 
types of the Messiah and their true antitype in Christ for example. In Edwards hands, 
however, the scheme took on significance far beyond a simple exegetical tool. He didn’t limit 
himself to seeing types and antitypes only in the Scriptures but in the realm of nature. He 
realises that he is going beyond his tradition and in writing a defence of his own position in a 
notebook entitled Types declares: 
 
“I am not ashamed to own that I believe that the whole universe, heaven and earth, air and 
seas, and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scriptures, be full of images of divine 
things, as full as a language is of words; and that the multitude of those things that I have 
mentioned are but a very small part of what is really intended to be signified and typified by 
those things; but that there is room for persons to be learning more and more of this 
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language and seeing more and more of that which is declared in it to the end of the world 
without discovering all”6 
 
The analogy of typology to language which Edwards makes here is important in two respects: 
First, it provides a defence against the assertion that typological interpretation is a purely 
subjective experience leading to uncontrolled flights of fancy. If we don’t learn the language 
properly “we shall use many barbarous expressions that fail entirely of the proper beauty of 
the language”7. This “language” is learnt in Scripture and applied to all creation. Second, and 
most important for our purposes, is that the analogy of “language” confirms that Edwards 
saw communication as the end of creation. He speaks above of “that which is declared” 
which is God. And more specifically it is the trinitarian God. Creation doesn’t communicate 
generic truths about “god in general” as the Deists thought, to speak that way is a “barbarous 
expression”. No, creation reflects the trinitarian God it was made to communicate. It is this 
trinitarian God in whose image humankind is made. As such one can only understand what 
it means to be human with reference to God’s trinitarian nature and humanity’s place in his 
plan. 
 
This introductory example shows the cohesion of Edwards’ thought. We have been able to 
trace lines of thinking that span metaphysics, theology, and biblical exegesis. In Edwards’ 
mind these are not separate disciplines but all serve God’s grand design of communicating 
himself to the creation. Shortly before his death Edwards’ planned to finish a “great work” 
entitled “A History of the Work of Redemption”, which was to be a “body of divinity in an 
entire new method, being thrown into the form of an history”.8 We will now move again 
through Edwards’ corpus following his example in tracing the course of history from God in 
himself through creation and God’s engagement with his people. In so doing we will draw 
out Edwards’ insights into the nature of humanity. 
 
It must finally be noted, by way of introduction, that I approach Edwards not primarily as an 
historian but as a student of systematic theology and ethics. As such, though I seek at all 
points to understand him in his own context my interest in his thought ultimately lies not in 
expounding his context but in placing him in dialogue with the broader Christian theology as 
well as contemporary ethics and psychology. 
  
                                                          
6 WJE 11.152 
7 WJE 11.151 
8 A Jonathan Edwards Reader eds. John Smith, Harry Stout, and Kenneth Minkema (London: Yale 
University Press, 1995) pgs. 322-323 
Chapter 1 
God Ad Intra 
 
In the true spirit of Jonathan Edwards, we must turn first to God ad intra, God in himself.  
For, as we have already seen, creation is, for Edwards, a function of God’s self-





In order to discuss Edwards’ understanding of who God is we must first get a handle on his 
metaphysics. Much that seems radical in Edwards’ thought finds its root in this area which, 
as has already been noted, he developed in opposition to the mechanistic views of reality 
held by the Deists.9 During the enlightenment old metaphysical assumptions were being 
challenged but without any consensus as to a way forward. The trajectory of thought which 
Edwards found particularly disconcerting and undertook to combat in particular was the 
type of materialism found in the work of Thomas Hobbes.10 In Hobbesian thinking theology 
and philosophy are to be radically separated11 with the result that although Hobbes “does not 
say that there is no God; he says that God is not the subject matter of philosophy”12. Hobbes 
equated philosophy with reasoning an activity which cannot, held Hobbes, lead to knowledge 
of God. In practise this leads to the idea that belief in God is by definition an irrational 
activity. Edwards was unable to accept that theology was fundamentally irrational. Edwards 
was not alone in using idealism to oppose materialism Edwards was not alone. There are 
certain striking similarities between him and Bishop George Berkeley. Though any evidence 
of a direct connection between them remains elusive.13  
 
Hobbes’ materialism stemmed from his separation of observed phenomena from any 
invisible underpinnings. That is, he argued, our senses are our only way we have to 
knowledge. Anything that goes beyond sense perception is not rational but simply 
speculation. This empiricism differ from Aristotelian empiricism in that Aristotle was happy 
to move from the observation of accidents (observed phenomena) to an explanation of 
underlying substances which one cannot directly observe. In fact, Edwards and Hobbes both 
wanted to reject what they saw as the arbitrary category of an underlying (unobservable) 
substance underlying observed accidents. Edwards, however, saw that Hobbes epistemology, 
in which sense perception was the only way to knowledge, excised God from the equation. 
For God, as Spirit, cannot be discerned immediately through sense perception. Edwards, 
who also rejected an Aristotelian epistemology, argued the complete opposite to Hobbes. 
Sense perception, says Edwards, could not come to knowledge since God is that which is 
ultimately real. Indeed, God is the only real substance, natural senses perceiving mere 
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shadows. ‘There is’ says Edwards ‘neither real substance nor property belonging to bodies; 
but all that is real, it is immediately in the first being.’14 For Edwards the epistemological 
question then becomes, ‘How is one able to discern God if unable to rely on the natural 
senses alone’? Edwards returns to this question frequently resulting in his doctrine of the 
‘spiritual sense’ in which God can be perceived directly. He used the taste of honey as an 
example arguing that as it is impossible to describe the taste of honey to someone who’s 
never had it, so we need to ‘sense’ God directly to know him. Christians, Edwards believed, 
had a ‘spiritual sense’ which provided this ‘direct’ knowledge.15 For now we simply note that 
Edwards moved forward with a rejection of Aristotelian categories whilst seeking to maintain 
the possibility of speaking truth about God. 
 
Edwards also perceived that the threat of materialism was not only that it explained the 
material world purely mechanistically, but that even morality was understood the same way. 
Hobbes’ insistence that matter is the only real substance, thus disposing of any idea of the 
spiritual or incorporeal, led ultimately to atheism. This disposal of the spiritual meant that 
everything, including moral actions, could be explained causally. Hobbes’ materialistic 
determinism was followed by a moral determinism in which one’s actions are simply the 
product of prior causes thus doing away with moral responsibility. As a Calvinist Edwards’ 
theological determinism has been understood as being in line with Hobbesian thinking at 
this point, indeed Edwards himself acknowledged a certain similarity.16 Edwards, however, 
placed great emphasis on the reality of man’s moral responsibility a topic that we shall treat 
in some depth later. 
 
Against materialism Edwards made a radical move. He did not simply argue that material 
things weren’t the only substances, rather, he took the step of arguing that matter wasn’t a 
substance at all.17 Edwards believed that ‘that there should be nothing at all is absolutely 
impossible’,18 for there truly to be nothing is an absurdity because it is impossible to 
imagine.19 That being the case and given that it is possible for material things not exist, on 
the grounds that it is possible to imagine them not to be, material substance cannot be the 
fundamental substance of the universe. He took it further however noting in an early 
miscellanies entry that, 
 
“We know there was being from eternity, and this being must be intelligent. For how doth 
one's mind refuse to believe, that there should be being from all eternity without its being 
conscious to itself that it was... For in what respect has anything had a being, when there is 
nothing conscious of its being?...supposing a room in which none is, none sees the things in 
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the room, no created intelligence: the things in the room have no being any other way than 
only as God is conscious [of them]”20 
 
So, with the understanding that being itself is necessary, that is it cannot not be. And that 
this being cannot be material, since we can imagine material objects not being. What then 
does its existence mean for the perceived material universe? 
 
“The secret lies here: that which truly is the substance of all bodies is the infinitely exact and 
precise and perfectly stable idea in God’s mind, together with his stable will that the same 
shall gradually be communicated to us, and to other minds, according to certain fixed and 
exact established methods and laws; or in somewhat different language, the infinitely exact 
and precise divine idea, together with an answerable, perfectly exact, precise and stable will 
with respect to correspondent communications to created minds, and effects on their 
minds”21 
 
Edwards then responded to his contemporary intellectual culture by revoicing traditional 
teaching. Where the traditional view had been that God and creation both had their own 
substances, and the materialist view that only that which is perceived can truly be called 
substance. Edwards turned everything on its head arguing that in fact God is the only true 
substance and that material, in that it could not be, is that which is not as real. Thus, the very 
reality of our own human existence depends not on our own perception but on God’s 




We have already seen in his metaphysics that Edwards didn’t oppose the new ways of 
thinking for the sake of argument. He engaged with them and appropriated them thought for 
his own ends. He was committed to scientific enquiry. In an early writing we find Edwards 
writing up his observations of a flying spider to the Royal Society.22 Even at this early stage 
he notes his scientific observations whilst drawing out the implications of God’s providence, 
arguing that God had ordained the movement of flying spiders towards the sea in order that 
the land not be overridden with them. He saw, and continued to see, no threat in science. 
Indeed, his observations concerning the providential ordering of spiders would be drawn out 
later in his doctrine of “excellence”. 
 
Excellence is fundamental to Edwardsian thought. Indeed the notion of excellency is so 
important for Edwards that Norman Fiering has suggested that he “perhaps...intended to 
rank [it]  with the classical transcendental attributes of being”.23 Early in his career Edwards 
explored what ‘excellency’ was in a series of entries in his notebook “The Mind”.24 Important 
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though the concept may be he notes at the outset that “there has nothing been more without 
a definition than excellency”.25 And so, he undertook to define it.  
 
Excellency, said Edwards, consists in one thing in harmony with another. A single dot on a 
page, for example, isn’t excellent. If we take two dots, they have a relationship with each 
other. They might be separated by 2 inches for example. However, we only really begin to see 
full excellency, however, if we add a third dot for if the third dot is placed 2 inches after the 
second the series as a whole is in proportion. If, on the other hand, the third dot were placed 
at a random unproportioned distance then the whole is not in harmony and, therefore, not 
excellent. At this point in his explanation Edwards insists that there is a bigger view one 
must take. For if the third dot were placed at four inches from the second it may initially 
seem to be inharmonious. However, a view of the whole might reveal a fourth dot placed at 
eight inches distant which would reveal an overall scheme wherein each individual dot is in 
proper proportion. The simplicity of this explanation belies the complexity of excellency 
within nature, let alone the godhead. Indeed, the ability to perceive excellency is directly 
related to the capacity of the creature: 
 
“We see that the narrower the capacity, the more simple must be the beauty to please. Thus 
in the proportion of sounds, the birds and brute creatures are most delighted with simple 
music, and in the proportion confined to a few notes”26 
 
A view of the whole is required truly to perceive excellency. Thus, the more one understands 
and has a view of the whole (that is, the more of God’s knowledge has been communicated to 
the creature) the greater the perception of overall proportion and true excellence. 
 
It’s important for us to see that although Edwards saw the need to provide a definition for 
excellency, he did not create the idea ex nihilo. Rather, he is again expressing his inherited 
tradition in contemporary forms. His Puritan heritage contained a strong stream of 
understanding beauty in harmony. The early Puritan Richard Sibbes, for example, in his 
commentary on 2 Corinthians 1 says:27 
 
“The sweetness of music ariseth from many instruments, and from the concord of all the 
strings in every instrument. When every instrument hath many strings, and all are in tune, it 
makes sweet harmony, it makes sweet concord. So, when many give God thanks, and every 
one hath a good heart set in tune, when they are good Christians all, it is wondrous 
acceptable music to God, it is sweet incense; more acceptable to God than any sweet savour 
and odour can be to us”28 
 
This passage is notable because not only does Sibbes’ view the beauty of harmony in music as 
an image of the beauty in spiritual harmony in the church. He even says that God finds 
spiritual harmony more beautiful than the beauty we finite creatures are able to experience. 
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A very similar point to that which Edwards makes in the quotation above. The important 
move that Edwards makes is to place excellency at the centre of his metaphysics and, 
therefore, his theology. It particularly important for us to note that the concept stands at the 
basis of his ethics as well, which we shall explore in some detail later.  
 
It isn’t only that one must perceive the whole in order to have a true view of excellency. It’s 
also important to note that excellency is not something found first in the created order. 
Rather, true excellency is found first in God and is reflectively in creation. In “The Mind” no. 
45 Edwards reasons that “as to God’s excellence, it is evident it consists in the love of 
himself. For he was as excellent before he created the universe as he is now”. As has been 
noted already, Edwards’ idealism meant that God is the most real substance. God is the mind 
which is fundamental to the existence of everything else as ideas in that mind. For God to be 
excellent he must be trinity. For God to be excellent means that he “exerts himself towards 
himself no other way than in infinitely loving and delighting in himself, in the mutual love of 
the Father and the Son”.29 “One alone, without reference to any more, cannot be excellent; 
for in such a case there can be no manner of relation no way, and therefore no such thing as 
consent”.30 
 
This leads to the simple logic that (A) one alone cannot be excellent, (B) God is excellent. 
Therefore (C) God is irreducibly plural. This plurality and excellency is not an attribute but is 
essential, it is part of the basic ontology of an essence. Stephen Daniel puts it this way: 
Edwards “does not...begin with the assumption of the ontological independence of the thing; 
it is not a thing first and only afterwards designated as beautiful”.31 Daniel uses the term 
beauty to encompass excellency since beauty is found in a subject’s proportion and consent 
of one being with another. Daniel’s point then is that Edward’s understood excellency to be 




Edwards, then, was a thoroughly trinitarian theologian as his doctrine of irreducible plurality 
shows. Irreducible plurality does, however, pose certain questions if he is also to hold to the 
traditional doctrine of divine simplicity. We need first to see first why irreducible plurality 
was so important for Edwards before turning to consider his views on simplicity. As in many 
areas of his thought Edwards’ in his trinitarian theology, was creative and his ideas have 
enjoyed a varied reception.32 In Discourse on the Trinity Edwards describes the second 
person of the Trinity as, “the (1) eternal, (2) necessary, (3) perfect, (4) substantial and (5) 
personal idea which God hath of himself”33. These five attributes must all be understood as 
essential to Edwards’ conception of God’s trinitarian nature. 
 
                                                          
29 WJE 6.364 
30 WJE 6.337. ‘Consent’ in Edwardsian terminology is the acceptance of position between one being 
and another. One who loves another and seeks their well-being, for example, ‘consents’ to them (WJE 
6:336) 
31 Stephen H. Daniel The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards (Indiana: University Press, 1994) pg. 182 
32 Michael McClymond & Gerald McDermott The Theology of Jonathan Edwards (OUP, 2012) pg. 
193n.1 
33 WJE 21.117, numbers added. 
First, the Son is eternal. Though generated, being the image and idea of the Father, there was 
never a time when he was not. For when could there have been a time when God ‘directly 
considered’ was without an idea of himself? Second, unlike creation the Son is necessary. 
There is no possibility that he could not be. An argument we have already seen Edwards use 
to argue for God’s being true substance. Third, he is perfect. That is, as the perfect image of 
the Father he is what the Father is. Fourth, he is substantial, as already noted this for 
Edwards is related to his being necessary. Edwards held that God’s omnipotence meant that 
his idea is substantial because he himself, of whom the idea is, is substantial. The idea a 
creature has of something isn’t substantial, because it cannot have the perfect idea of a thing. 
When we think or imagine something our idea is less than the reality. God’s idea, however, is 
substantial because as a perfect idea it is a true reflection of the original, an original which 
was itself substantial.  
 
Fifth, Edwards defends the use of the term “person” in his Treatise on Grace where he 
writes, “though the word “person” be rarely used in the Scriptures, yet I believe that we have 
no word in the English language that does so naturally represent what the Scripture reveals 
of the distinction of the eternal three-Father, Son and Holy Ghost-as to say they are one God 
but three persons”.34 Here we see that Edwards accepts the word “person”, not on the 
grounds of tradition, but because it accords with the Scriptures. He couches his doctrine in 
these terms because the “basic challenge to the old way of thinking about things did not 
escape Jonathan Edwards. He attempted to renew the original spirit of trinitarian doctrine 
without ignoring the urgent philosophical issues of the Enlightenment”35. Indeed, with his 
idealist metaphysic he was able to state boldly concerning the Trinity that, “reason is 
sufficient to tell us that there must be these distinctions in the Deity”.36 
 
The two major aspects of his thought discussed above, namely his idealism and his 
understanding of excellence play major parts in his doctrine of God. We have seen Edwards’ 
idealism underwriting much of his argument in the five statements concerning God in 
general and the second person of the Trinity in particular. His understanding that being is 
constituted by a perfect idea, in a perfect mind, and perfectly willed leads him to say that “the 
knowledge God has of himself must necessarily be conceived to be something distinct from 
his mere direct existence...And I do suppose the Deity to be truly and properly repeated by 
God’s thus having an idea of himself; and that this idea of God is a substantial idea and the 
very essence of God, is truly God, to all intents and purposes, and that by this means the 
Godhead is really generated and repeated”.37 God’s idea really exists because God’s idea is a 
perfect idea, not a mere shadow as are our ideas. This idea is ontologically real and really 
distinct. At this point Edwards’ thinking is on a track which can be found as far back as 
Origen38 who argued that since the second person of the Trinity is God’s Wisdom, he must be 
eternally generated or else there would have to have been a time when God was without 
Wisdom. Since it is unthinkable for God to be without his own Wisdom, Wisdom must be 
                                                          
34 WJE 21.181 
35 Sang Hyun Lee “Introduction” in WJE 21.5 
36 WJE 21.131; see also 132 line 5 
37 WJE 21.114 
38 Origen, On First Principles, 1.2.2 
generated from eternity.39 Edwards’ thinking is, however, placed on a different metaphysical 
foundation from most Christian thinkers prior to him. 
 
Edwards’ lack of traditional language does little to disguise the fact that for Edwards the Son 
is the perfect image of the Father, eternally generated and of one being. In his language 
Edwards expresses it that the perfect idea of a thing is exactly the thing itself in every way 
and yet a distinct idea. Yet, as we have seen, this is a traditional explanation which Edwards 




Edwards’ doctrine of excellency, leading as it does to his understanding of irreducible 
plurality within the godhead, leads us to question how Edwards stood in relation to the 
doctrine of Divine Simplicity. Thomas Aquinas (followed by the Reformed Orthodox whom 
Edwards studied at Yale) defined God’s simplicity in the following way: 
 
“There is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since he is not a body; nor 
composition of form and matter; nor does his nature differ from his suppositum; nor his 
essence from his existence; neither is there in him composition of genus and difference, nor 
of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether 
simple”40 
 
The reformed orthodox subscribed to this account wherein God is known as actus 
purissimus et simplicissimus. Amandus Polanus (1561-1610) wrote that, “God’s essential 
attributes are really his very essence...whatever there is in God is one. Moreover, there ought 
to be absent from the prime unity all difference and all number whatsoever”.41 Yet Edwards 
wrote,  
 
“It is a maxim amongst divines that everything that is in God is God...If a man should tell me 
that the immutability of God is God, or that the omnipresence of God and authority of God 
[is God], I should not be able to think of any rational meaning of what is said”42 
 
The above statement, alongside his insistence that “one alone...cannot be excellent” seems to 
oppose his received tradition which states that simplicity means that in God there is no 
“number whatsoever”. Indeed, it is a cause for much debate in the secondary literature.43 We 
cannot settle this question here, but we must note that, however he worked it out, Edwards’ 
certainly seems to privilege God’s excellency and diversity over his unity. Or, if that is too 
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strong, we can say that, however he worked it out, both Edwards’ biblical exegesis and 
philosophical insights led him to insist that God is irreducibly plural. That at the bottom of 
reality there is relationship. That the Bible’s claim that “God is Love” (1 John 4.8, 16) 
“shows”, says Edwards, “that there are more persons than one in the Deity”44. The impact of 
this privileging of plurality over simplicity will become clear as we move on for as creation is 
made in such a way that reflects a God in whom there is diversity there is not a single way to 
be perfect. The perfection of a being is not simply becoming more like a single monadic 
being. Rather, perfection involves a being taking its place in the scheme. Diversity and 




Our discussion so far has concentrated primarily on Edwards’ philosophical underpinnings. 
Indeed, much of Edwards studies, and much historical theology in general, has been done 
without a sufficient appreciation for the control Scripture placed on a given thinkers thought. 
Writing about the fourth century Lewis Ayres has argued that to understand the fourth 
century debates we must understand contemporary exegetical practices.45 The same is true 
for Edwards’ thought. Only recently has there been sustained investigation into Edwards’ 
exegesis.46 Edwards, like the Church Fathers, sought to exegete the Scriptures within a 
philosophical framework that adhered to those same Scriptures. It is this continuity of 
Scripture alongside the discontinuity of his metaphysics that accounts for the occasional 
strangeness of Edwards’ thought. 
 
It is also worthy of note that much of what Edwards wrote on philosophy, and that we have 
drawn from here, was from the early part of his life. The notebook “The Mind”, to which we 
have referred on several occasions, was written sometime after 1723, by which time he had 
already developed his basic metaphysical framework.47 Yet despite this, and given the fact 
that the more explicitly theological works to which we shall turn later were written in the 
1750s Edwards never moved from the basic framework he developed whilst tutor at Yale. 
That is to say that despite the fact that Edwards metaphysical notebooks and his developed 
ethical treatises were separated by around 30 years the former still provided the framework 
for the latter. This unity of Edwards’ thought across time is also found across subjects. Sang 
Hyun Lee puts it this way: 
 
“What is striking about Jonathan Edwards’ writings on the Trinity is that there is none of 
this bifurcation between the doctrine of the Trinity and the Christian life of faith and 
practice. Everything Edwards wrote about the Trinity expresses the intertwining 
connectedness of the Trinity and the Christian’s experience of God as the Creator, Savior, 
and Sanctifier, and thus between the immanent and the economic Trinity”48 
 
                                                          
44 WJE 21.113 
45 Ibid. pg. 31-40 
46 Robert Brown Jonathan Edwards and the Bible (Indiana State University Press, 2002); Douglas 
Sweeney “The Biblical World of Jonathan Edwards” Jonathan Edwards Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (2013), 
221-268; ibid. Edwards the Exegete (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 
47 Wallace Anderson “Introduction” in WJE 6.33 
48 WJE 21.3 
It is clear even now that with Edwards’ metaphysical understanding any account of what it 
means to be human has to be grounded in the being of the God, the only real substance. That 
the existence of all material creation, humanity not excluded, is carried on by God’s stable 
idea and will will have profound implications for Edwards explication of Christian ethics in 




Trinity Ad Extra 
 
So far our primary material has been drawn from Edwards’ early philosophical notebooks 
from his days at Yale. In his later years Edwards turned to a systematic defence of Reformed, 
or Calvinistic, doctrine.49 In 1754 he completed and published Freedom of the Will and at the 
time of his death had Original Sin ready for the publisher, published posthumously in 1758. 
Along with his Two Dissertations these represent his mature work. Freedom of the Will and 
Original Sin are defences against specific opponents whereas the Two Dissertations sought 
more broadly to undermine the foundations of where contemporary thought had gone 
wrong.50 The Two Dissertations (though to be seen as one work) are known separately as 
The End for Which God Created the World and The Nature of True Virtue. We will come to 




The Reformations of the sixteenth century primarily concerned the questions of justification, 
the nature of the sacraments, and authority.51 In the following century the Reformed 
Scholastics, from whom Edwards inherited his theology, set out to provide complete 
protestant theologies. This required them to address the doctrine of God in a way the 
reformers hadn’t needed to and they turned to traditional Aristotelian language and method 
as found in their scholastic predecessors of the medieval period. In our discussion of God ad 
intra we noted a tension between God’s plurality and divine simplicity. In the doctrine of 
creation, God ad extra, there is also a theological tension, this time between God’s aseity, 
that is God’s total self-reliance, and the fact of creation. The question is, “Why, if God is 
complete in himself, does creation exist?” Zacharias Ursinus, one of the writers of the 
Heidelberg Catechism, states that: 
 
“God created the world not by an absolute necessity but by the one which is termed 
consequentiae, or ex hypothesi, sc. suae voluntatis, although by His eternal and immutable, 
yet utterly free decree”52 
 
Ursinus highlights the two key points which the theologian must maintain. First, God 
mustn’t be understood to have created through any necessity but from his ‘utterly free 
decree’. To say otherwise would posit something outside of God exerting an influence on him 
which would mean he wasn’t a se, entirely sufficient in and of himself. Second, and on the 
other hand, creation has been eternally and immutably decreed. It did not enter God’s mind 
at some point since that would posit a change in his knowledge which was and is always 
complete. So, creation can neither be thought to have any existence outside of God, nor can it 
be an idea that came to God since both would lead to the same conclusion: that God is 
somehow dependent on something outside himself. These two points lead to the obvious 
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question as to why God created at all and why he created when he did rather than at another 
time. 
 
Edwards’ Reformed predecessors answered that there was a difference between the idea of 
creation and creation actualised in its material state. William Ames writes that: 
 
“Before the creation, creatures had no real being (esse reale) either in existence or essence, 
although they had being known (esse cognitum) from eternity in the knowledge of God. 
Creation then produces out of nothing, that is, out of matter which had no preexistence”53 
 
In this way Ames can defend the temporal reality of creation as things having esse reale at 
the same time as safeguarding God’s infinite knowledge of creation stretching back into 
eternity. Edwards’ idealism, however, doesn’t allow for this explanation. Holding that being 
is a matter of being perceived in a mind means that Ames’ distinction between esse cognitum 
and esse reale cannot be truly distinguished.  
 
It will be instructive to take Edwards’ argument in On the Trinity as an example which 
highlights this difficulty. As we saw in chapter one, and as he argues again in this 
unpublished notebook, Edwards says that “in perfectly beholding and infinitely loving, and 
rejoicing in, his own essence and perfections. And accordingly it must be supposed that God 
perpetually and eternally has a most perfect idea of himself”.54 Furthermore his idealism 
leads him to state:  “I do suppose the Deity to be truly and properly repeated by God's thus 
having an idea of himself; and that this idea of God is a substantial idea and has the very 
essence of God, is truly God, to all intents and purposes, and that by this means the Godhead 
is really generated and repeated.”.55 God’s perception of himself involves having an idea of 
himself. Moreover, perfect perception results in a perfect idea. A perfect image, he will argue 
a little later, is the same as the original. 
 
An issue arises when we come to consider that if God’s perfect knowledge of himself results 
in a perfect ‘substantial’ idea, wherein lies the difference between the second person of the 
trinity and the created order? For surely God’s perfect knowledge of creation substantiates 
creation placing them on the same plain. Edwards’ answer is, again, God’s self-
communication. The creation is differentiated from God’s eternal idea in that it becomes a 
partaker of God’s own knowledge. 
 
Edwards addressed the more basic question of why God created at all in End of Creation and 
in so doing utilises arguments developed in Freedom of the Will. Arguments which Sang 
Hyun Lee has described as Edwards’ ‘dispositional ontology’.56 Keeping our purposes in 
mind namely, what Edwards taught it means to be human, we will see important 
implications in his answer. His dispositional ontology becomes key not only for his theology 
proper but also for his understanding of the created order in general and humanity in 
particular. 
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As in all his work Edward’s fundamental convictions in End of Creation were based upon 
Scripture. At the start of the work he states that “it would be relying too much on reason to 
determine the affair of God’s last end in the creation of the world, relying only by our own 
reason, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation”57. Writing this at the 
start of the first half of the work titled “Wherein Is Considered What Reason Teaches 
Concerning This Affair” Edwards has an important place for reason, but it is reason 
“principally guided” by revelation. This is worth our remembering because, like Augustine 
and Anselm before him, the exploration of theology through the use of reason is not 
something which can be detached from revelation. 
 
Edwards is careful at the beginning of End of Creation to define his terms. There are several 
uses of ‘end’ which need to be clear to the mind in order to follow his thread. First, a chief 
end is any end which is sought for its own sake. Second, a subordinate end is sought in order 
to achieve a chief end. Third, an ultimate end is a being’s primary chief end (allowing at this 
point that there could be more than one ultimate end). That is to say, the end that is most 
important. Perhaps the most significant distinction comes in his subdivision of ultimate ends 
into two. An ultimate end may be either absolute or consequential. The former is an end 
which a being has with nothing else considered, the latter is an end with present 
circumstances considered. Edwards gives the example of a man who wants a family. His 
desire for a family is an absolute ultimate end because it is contingent on any particulars. 
Once he has a family the well-being of that family becomes a consequential ultimate end 
because its existence as an end depends on the existence of the family whereas his desire for 
family in general, absolutely considered, does not. 
 
Edwards’ relentless logic means that the with these definitions in place the outcome is clear. 
To explore the question why God made the world is to explore specifically his absolute 
ultimate end. For creation, made in time, cannot be a factor, or else God becomes dependent 
on creation. His care for creation, including the work of redemption, if considered an 
ultimate end, must be considered a consequential ultimate end. That is to say, since it is 
necessary for the existence of creation to precede the end of its redemption, God’s redeeming 
of creation cannot account for the basic existence of creation in the first place. We must, 
therefore, look for God’s absolute ultimate end in himself without reference to creation. 
 
The argument that Edwards’ gives at this point will be key for his understanding of the 
nature of the created order and for his ethics. The very question that he seeks here to answer, 
namely: “Why does anything exist?” leads to further questions about what is good, what ends 
are worth choosing? Thus “metaphysics” is “tied into ethics”.58 
 
Considering God’s absolute ultimate end means considering that which was worthy to be 
valued by him prior to creation which leads inexorably to the conclusion that “he had respect 
to himself as his last and highest end in this work; because he is worthy in himself to be so, 
being infinitely the greatest and best of beings”59. Edwards defends this thesis in a 
remarkable passage in which he utilises a hypothetical ‘Supreme Arbiter’. Suppose there 
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were a completely impartial observer of the universe, says Edwards, what would that 
observer view as most valuable and worthy? Well if he were to judge impartially he would 
know “that the degree of regard should always be in a proportion compounded of the 
proportion of existence and proportion of excellence”60. It is clear that God is: 
 
“Over all, to whom all are properly subordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as 
supreme head with absolute and universal dominion; so it is fit that he should be regarded 
by all and in all proceedings and effects through the whole system: that this universality of 
things in their whole compass and series should look to him and respect him in such a 
manner as that respect to him should reign over all respect to other things, and that regard 
to creatures should universally be subordinate and subject”61 
 
God, “himself possessed of...perfect discernment and rectitude”62, is the supreme arbiter and 
knows that it is fitting that he himself is to be valued above all else. 
 
So why creation? If God is a se, complete and perfect in himself, totally without need of 
creation, why did he create? It is in answering this question that Edwards’ makes an original 
contribution. Edwards is keen to uphold God’s aseity but he can also say that, “In some sense 
it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for63 the holiness and 
happiness of his creatures”64. In his doctrine of God, we saw Edwards privilege God’s 
plurality over his simplicity. Here we see him privilege God’s love and involvement for 
creation over his impassibility. That is not to say that he makes God in any way dependent on 
creation. Rather he is able to hold them together because, as he had stated earlier in the 
treatise, “a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his 
own infinite fullness, was what excited him to create the world”65. 
 
God, absolutely considered, prior to creation, was predisposed to emanate his own fullness. 
That is, to exercise his attributes of power and wisdom. The exercise of this disposition 
doesn’t make him complete in any way that he wasn’t before, but he also “would be less 
happy, if he were less good, or if he had not that perfection of nature which consist in a 
propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fullness”66. To get at what Edwards is arguing here 
we must look to Freedom of the Will. 
 
In Freedom of the Will Edwards’ explored the nature of necessity asking what it really 
means. Noting that it usually implies something from outside compelling an action against 
the agent’s will. This observation led him to make a distinction between natural necessity 
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and moral necessity. The former concerns necessity as understood in everyday life, an 
outside force which compels or prohibits a particular course of action, an action not willed by 
the agent. The latter refers to the necessity by which our habits and dispositions direct our 
actions. We may not be ‘forced’ by anything outside ourselves, but neither are we able to do 
otherwise because we don’t want to. This moral necessity is not forced in any way but is also 
necessary in that it could not be otherwise. Edwards holds that actions can be both necessary 
and totally free since freedom is doing what we will.67 If an agent is free, that is without 
external limiting factors, then doing what he or she wills is a necessary outcome. It could not 
be otherwise. This argument is worked out in the realm of human action but towards the end 
of the work Edwards states that “if these things are true, it will follow, that not only the will 
of created minds, but the will of God himself is necessary in all its determinations”68. These 
determinations in God are made “by what he sees to be fittest and best”69. 
 
Thus, creation is caused by God’s predisposition to self-emanation. Not compelled by any 
external force but by his own regard to himself, to his own glory. God’s happiness, though 
not completed or fulfilled by creation, would be curtailed if he hadn’t exercised his 
disposition to create. Indeed, for God not to create would require an external force 
compelling him to act in a way out of line with his nature. In this way Edwards’ sees God as a 
se as well as providing a rationale for the created order. 
 
The Nature of Creation 
 
We have already noted creation’s nature as divine emanation. And as such it is an ‘image’ of 
the divine. This is true of the whole of the created order. Edwards taught that God created for 
his own glory but insisted that this end is not opposed to the end of the creature's happiness. 
Jonathan Edwards Jr. wrote that his father was “the first, who clearly showed that they are 
really only one end, and that they are really one and the same thing”70. 
 
As he did in the area of metaphysics, so he brought together his tradition framed in a way 
that spoke to his contemporary situation. Norman Fiering has observed that, 
 
“Moral philosophers had begun the process of converting into secular and naturalistic terms 
crucial parts of the Christian heritage. Edwards in a sense reversed the ongoing process by 
assimilating the moral philosophy of his time and converting it back into the language of 
religious thought and experience”.71 
 
Thomas Hobbes argued in Leviathan (1651) that right and wrong were subjective terms 
which simply described what an individual liked or disliked.72 Though he was not largely 
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followed at the time (Moral Relativism was to become a prominent position in the 20th 
century)73 Hobbes does represent increasingly egoistic interpretations of morality of the 
enlightenment. The “moral sense” philosophers Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson 
taught that humans inherently knew what was right and wrong, all they needed to do was to 
turn to their internal moral compass. Whether a thoroughgoing moral relativism as in the 
case with Hobbes or inherent knowledge of right and wrong as with the “moral sense” 
philosophers, these subjective approaches to morality take a completely different 
understanding of the nature of creation. 
 
Edwards’ understanding that creation was necessarily created because of God’s disposition 
to self-emanation allied with his understanding that creation is God’s sharing of himself with 
his creatures means that he is able to hold (objectively) that God is primary. He is the chief 
good and, therefore, his own highest end. Whilst at the same time holding that humanity’s 
happiness is not subservient to God’s happiness because humanity’s happiness itself consists 
in sharing in God’s glory. 
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Chapter 3 
Sin and the Work of Redemption 
 
We have had cause, so far, to discuss firstly who God is in himself and secondly his works. 
This God-centred approach is foundational for all Edwards’ theological thinking, not least his 
ethical thought. Edwards was a theological objectivist, that is he affirmed “the absolute 
primacy of deity, metaphysically, morally, and spiritually”.74 For Edwards God must be 
considered first and absolutely, that is without reference to anything or anyone else. 
Edwards saw that for “God to be God by definition [he] not only possesses moral perfection, 
but also establishes the norms of righteousness”.75 In order to understand what it truly 
means to be human, one must start and end with God rather than the human person 
(theological subjectivism), or the human need (theological utilitarianism). In exploring 
Edwards’ ethical thinking we will find an account that isn’t simply voluntaristic, that is one 
in which God makes arbitrary decisions and they’re good decision simply because God made 
them, though it is that. Edwards also insisted on the human capacity to see goodness as a 
standard that can be understood by (sanctified) reason. In so doing he develops an account 
of ethics that is able to maintain the primacy of God and the inherent goodness of all his 
decisions without making those decisions arbitrary and robbing human agents of 
accountability. 
 
We have seen that Edwards explained the purpose of creation as being for God’s glory. And 
that “as all things are from God as their first cause and fountain; so, all things tend to him, 
and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity”76. Indeed, he 
makes the remarkable claim that “the nearer anything comes to infinite, the nearer it comes 
to identity with God”77. It is because God is that which is most worthy that his own glory is 
the end of creation. Similarly, just as it is fitting that God should make himself his own end, 
it is also fitting that he also be the end of the created order. 
 
Before we can come to a fuller account of Edwards’ ethical thought we must first understand 
what Edwards understood concerning what went wrong in God’s external work, that is: sin. 




For us to understand what sin meant for Edwards we must understand his theological 
anthropology, born out of the first great awakening. In 1737 Edwards’ Faithful Narrative 
was published in London. The work gave an account of a revival in Edwards’ hometown of 
Northampton beginning in 1733.78 The account provides a very positive picture of what has 
come to be known as the Valley Revival. By the time of publication, however, Edwards noted 
(in a final message dated 1736) that a recent controversy had “tended to put a stop to the 
glorious work here, and to prejudice the country against it, and hinder the propagation of 
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it”.79 The revival and its abrupt end set Edwards on a course of thinking about the nature of 
man which would culminate in Religious Affections (1746).80 In this work Edwards drew 
together his philosophical training as well as his pastoral experience. He sought, primarily, 
to explain the role of affections within the life of the soul. We speak here of ‘affections’ as that 
is the term that Edwards used in the work under discussion, it is worth noting however that 
one’s affections and dispositions are synonymous. Edwards discussed various ‘signs’ which 
one can expect to be displayed in the life of the truly regenerate person and in so doing 
developed a detailed analysis of human psychology, particularly as it consists in the 
affections. 
 
The soul, says Edwards, consists of two faculties: (1) the understanding which “views and 
judges of things”, and (2) the inclination or will which “does not merely perceive and view 
things, but is some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers”.81 Edwards 
always argued for the unity of the human person. Indeed, Gerald McDermott and Michael 
McClymond note that, “even the twofold distinction of understanding and inclination tends 
to break down in the course of Edwards’ discussion in Religious Affections. What one calls 
mind or understanding is the human self in one mode of operation, while inclination is 
another mode”.82 The human person, then, endowed with understanding and inclination, 
makes decisions based on what he or she loves and what he or she loves is that which is 
perceived as the greatest good. It is clear that in order for the person to be inclined, or to will, 
that which is willed must be perceived. As Edwards puts it, “there must be light in the 
understanding, as well as an affected fervent heart”.83 
 
Edwards states that “the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they 
differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul”.84 So Edwards believed in 
a unified human person who acts according to his or her affections (which are determined by 
understanding and inclination). The importance of Edwards’ understanding of the will for 
his theology in general, and his ethics in particular, would be hard to exaggerate for it is in 
the will that the effects of sin can be found. Indeed, when in Stockbridge he turned to work 
on his magnum opus he turned first to the question of the will in Freedom of the Will (1754) 
which laid the groundwork for Original Sin (1758), End of Creation (1765), and True Virtue 
(1765). 
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In Freedom of the Will Edwards taught that the will is “that by which the mind chooses 
anything”85 and is as “the greatest apparent good”.86 As has already been noted, the human 
person must perceive and that which it perceives as the greatest good is that which the 
person chooses. Edwards opponents’ primary objection was to the necessity in this model. 
For if the person necessarily chooses that which they perceive as the greatest good wherein is 
their freedom? And if there is no freedom, how can they be accountable for their actions? 
How can actions be accounted sinful? This particular question of accountability was in fact 
the very question addressed by Freedom of the Will, rather than the freedom of the will 
generally. The original title being, A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing 
Notions of that Freedom of the Will which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, 
Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. 
 
In answering this question of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness Edwards sought first to 
define his terms and one term that we have already seen he felt needed clarification was 
necessity. He sees that the reason people objected to the term necessity in determinations of 
the will was that it implied coercion. The understanding that if something is necessary then it 
doesn’t matter what you do it will still be the same outcome. As noted already Edwards said 
that the problem is that in its philosophical use it shouldn’t carry the force of assumed 
opposition. Rather necessity is simply something that is definite. In this sense there is no 
opposition between freedom and necessity. For Edwards defines freedom as “that power and 
opportunity” for a person “to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice”.87 So a 
person can be free to exercise the will and the outcome still to be necessary. For instance, if 
someone were to be given the choice between a large sum of money or a large amount of pain 
they are free to choose either option, there will not to suffer pain, however, makes the 
outcome necessary in the sense that it is simply definite They would choose the money. This 
necessity in doing what one wills was true for God in himself and it’s true also for humanity 
as created moral agents. It doesn’t require any coercion from outside the situation for it to 
result in the same outcome no matter how many times the scenario where replayed. There is 
simultaneously freedom and necessity. 
 
Edwards’ theological objectivism led him to move from God’s praiseworthiness to 
humanities blameworthiness. He titled section 3.1 of Freedom of the Will, “God’s Moral 
Excellency Necessary, Yet Virtuous and Praiseworthy”.88 Edwards argues here that since God 
is necessarily good and worthy of praise, and is the “fountain of all agency of virtue”, so 
man’s actions, though necessary, are praiseworthy or blameworthy. We saw that in End of 
Creation Edwards said that God made creation for his own glory because he saw himself as 
the greatest good. Indeed, it is necessary for God to make himself his own end for he knows 
himself to be the greatest good and therefore wills his own glory. No outside force is required 
or implied by saying that God’s making himself his own end is necessary it is simply to say 
that he is free to choose what he wills and he wills what he wills and so the outcome is 
necessary. 
 
The inclination of the will, therefore, is the important question, and it is in the will that the 
effect of sin is found. Edwards argues that the imago Dei, the image of God, consists, “in 
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those faculties and principles of nature, whereby he is capable of moral agency”.89 This is a 
profound statement for Edwards’ understanding of what it means to be human. God made 
humanity in his image: as a moral agent worthy of praise or blame. In order, therefore, to be 
human in the fullest and most original sense one must make right moral judgements.  
 
Freedom of will means, “that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or 
according to his choice”.90 Sin means that the individual moral agent wills, not that which is 
in accord with the greatest good, namely God, for the fallen person is unable to know God, 
but the greatest perceived good. And in the fallen state that means oneself. Sin involves a 




We have seen that at the same time as Northampton’s reputation was growing Edwards saw 
signs that “many of his parishioners were returning to their old ways of greed and 
infighting”91. In response to this cooling of the fires of revival in his town Edwards preached 
three sermon series:92 Firstly, True and False Christians.93 Secondly, Charity and its 
Fruits.94 Thirdly, A History of the Work of Redemption.95 These three series explore the very 
themes, and in the very same order, that we have been tracing. In True and False Christians 
Edwards teaches, “That the visible church of Christ is made up of true and false christians”96 
and that “Those two sorts of Christians do in many things agree, and yet in many other 
things do greatly differ”97. In expounding this doctrine, he explores the ways in which true 
and false Christians agree and differ in order to ascertain counterfeit signs of conversion. The 
arguments Edwards uses here were to find their fullest expression in Religious Affections. In 
the second sermon, Charity and its Fruits, Edwards goes on from counterfeit signs to think 
about what true signs of regeneration are (many arguments here are developed in a more 
academic setting in True Virtue). The series culminates in the sermon Heaven is a World of 
Love in which Edwards expresses the view that love is the basic principle from which godly 
affections arise. This love, says Edwards, is a reflection of the self-giving love that is found in 
the trinitarian godhead: 
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“There in heaven this fountain of love, this eternal three in one, is set open without any 
obstacle to hinder access to it. There this glorious God is manifested and shines forth in full 
glory, in beams of love; there the fountain overflows in streams and rivers of love and 
delight, enough for all to drink at, and to swim in, yea, so as to overflow the world as it were 
with a deluge of love”98 
 
Edwards, having observed that there are a great many things in which true and false 
Christians agree and having located the true change wrought in regeneration in the will, 
turns to The History of the Work of Redemption. In this sermon series Edwards explores the 
whole history of the world, tracing the way in which God has dealt with sin and brought a 
people back into fellowship with himself. He travels from creation through the fall, which 
entails the narrowing of love to being in general (his term for a love which ‘sees the whole’ in 
their true excellence, properly ordered) to self-love. Through to redemption, which entails 
the broadening of one’s horizons to love to being in general. This observation relates back to 
his doctrine of excellency in that one’s inability to see the whole means that beauty is not 
fully and rightly perceived. This skewed perception of what is good is sin. Throughout The 
History of the Work of Redemption Edwards is concerned with what redemption means and 
how it is achieved and applied. The doctrine99 for the sermon is that, “The Work of 
Redemption is a work that God carries on from the fall of man to the end of the world”100 
 
As a Reformed theologian Edwards ordered his thinking about the scopus of Scripture, and 
therefore history, covenantally. He accepted the view that there were three major covenants 
that may be distinguished. Namely: the covenant of works, the covenant of grace, and the 
covenant of redemption. Our interest lies primarily in the covenant of redemption which 
Edwards describes as being, “All that Christ does in this great affair [redemption]...And not 
only what Christ the mediator has done, but also what the Father and the Holy Ghost have 
done as united or confederated in this design of redeeming sinful mean; or in one word, all 
that is wrought in execution of the eternal covenant of redemption”.101 
 
Any account of Edwards’ thought risks treating only a small portion of the man. He was, as 
we have already seen, a metaphysician, a theologian, and a revivalist (distinctions that would 
have been alien to him). The history of Edwards studies reveals that few have sought, or been 
able, to hold the whole man together. We have sought to root his thinking in his life in order 
to show the integral link in Edwards thought between metaphysics and his pastoral charge. 
We have already seed that he wasn’t speculative for the sake of speculation, rather, he sought 
to understand the very essence of the universe in order to grasp God’s purposes. We find 
these threads drawn together beautifully in History of the Work of Redemption and his 
understanding of history. 
 
As Edwards looked back on history he saw that revivals were part of God’s providential plan 
to draw people’s affections to himself. Edwards finds the first signs of revival in Genesis 4.26, 
“then began men to call upon the name of the Lord”. He argues that since prayer is “a duty of 
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natural religion”102 it can’t mean that people didn’t pray before, rather, it must mean that “it 
was carried far beyond whatever it had been before, which must be the consequence of a 
remarkable pouring out of the Spirit of God”.103 Commenting on the later history of Israel 
Edwards notes that “God was pleased several times after great degeneracy” to grant “blessed 
revivals by remarkable outpourings of his Spirit”.104 Edwards continued to expound history 
after the biblical period, seeing the reformation was a time of revival for example.105 
Continuing on he finally arrives at the Valley Revival,106 seeing it as a continuation of the 
outpourings of the Spirit through which God had typically worked to turn hearts back to 
himself. Edwards had already noted this observation at the beginning of History of the Work 
of Redemption when he argued that “from the fall of man to this day wherein we live the 
Work of Redemption in its effect has mainly been carried on by remarkable pourings out of 
the Spirit of God”107. God has worked in this way throughout history because it is the only 




If sin then is the disordering of one’s affections. Redemption is their reordering. This 
reordering of loves is not the ultimate purpose of creation. For as we saw in chapter 3, God’s 
absolute ultimate end in creation was his own glory. The work of redemption that God 
carries on from the fall of man to the end of the world is an end subordinate to that of his 
own glory. Certainly, God is glorified in the work of redemption, but the work is 
consequential, it relies on the existence of creation in order to be an end. As a pastor 
Edwards was always practical and his ethics, to which we will turn next, are no exception. 
This practical element to his thought means that he is always dealing with man as sinner, 
though we must remember that that is not all that a person is and ultimately doesn’t define 
who they are. Christian ethics are always seeking to recapture humanity as God originally 
intended it. 
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“No reasonable creature can be happy, we find, without society and communion, not only 
because he finds something in others that is not in himself, but because he delights to 
communicate himself to another. This cannot be because of our imperfection, but because 
we are made in the image of God; for the more perfect any creature is, the more strong this 
inclination. So that we may conclude, that Jehovah's happiness consists in communion, as 
well as the creature's.”108  
 
As we come to discuss Edwards’ ethical thought we begin to draw the threads together which 
we have traced throughout his life and work. His ethics in particular no less than his theology 
as a whole are theologically objective. We have covered much ground in Edwards’ thought, 
through metaphysics, theology proper, creation, fall, and redemption. Study of all these areas 
has set the foundation for all that Edwards has to say concerning what it means to be truly 
human. His ethical thought is more than simply an idea about how civilization may or may 
not be run. It’s more than a theory which could be substituted for another. Edwards’ ethics is 
about how human beings should behave. That is not to say should in a sense which seeks to 
control and manipulate. Rather it’s to say that to behave in any other way would be somehow 
to behave in a subhuman way. 
 
Edwards doctrine of God, though expounded in a novel idealist framework, is in many ways 
a conservative trinitarian one. Edwards noted that God’s being trinitarian is essential to his 
nature as love. To love requires an object and in God the Father’s object of love is his Son, his 
perfect image and likeness. When it comes to the image of God in man it is imperative that 
this be borne in mind. For to be truly human means to grow in the likeness of the image of 
God. This means growing in outward love. Love to an object other than oneself. We have 
seen that Charity and its Fruits Edwards ends with the sermon Heaven is a World of Love in 
which he sets forth his vision of perfect love in heaven where he describes the overflowing 
fountain of love which flows from the “eternal three in one”.109 God’s inner trinitarian self-
giving love is the model for perfect human love. 
 
In creation we find that God’s loving disposition leads him to share himself with the created 
order. Creation is a result of God’s “overflowing” with love in which humankind participates. 
For humankind to fulfil its true nature as God’s image bearers it partakes in God’s outward 
looking love. 
 
The nature of sin is such that humanity’s disposition to love another is turned in on itself. Sin 
is the result of corrupt inclinations in act. Original sin means that humankind wants to sin. 
Freedom of the will means doing what one wants and what sinful humanity wants is rooted 
in self-love. The nature of redemption, therefore, is a profound change from a disposition of 
self-love to an outward God mirroring love. A love that glories in God’s glory as the one most 
worthy of honour. 
 
It’s true that Edwards does allow that there may be good acts performed by someone who 
isn’t regenerate though it is rather the result of common grace acting from outside the agent 
who is ultimately motivated by sinful dispositions than the inward change which the Holy 
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Spirit brings. Conversion is the planting of the new principle in the person who from then on 
performs ethical acts not through self-love, but through ‘love to being on general’. 
 
We may note that Edwards’ ethics are closely tied to the major concern in his pastoral life: 
conversion. Edwards and the other preachers of the Great Awakening were driven by the 
belief that people needed God’s Holy Spirit to implant in them the new disposition that 
would restore them in the image of God lost at the fall. This conversion was essential to 
participating in God’s life and purposes for humanity. His works, whether his major treatises 
or his sermons, were dedicated to exposing hypocrisy and bringing the sinner to understand 
the need for regeneration. Conversion meant far more than simply ‘getting to heaven’. 
Edwards liked to point out that mere assent to propositional truth was shared as much by the 
demons as it was by the Christian. The demon may even declare that Jesus is Lord. The 
difference between the two lies not simply in knowledge but in disposition. The demons hate 
God and Christ and consider their lordship with hatred. The redeemed sinner welcomes the 
lordship of Christ over the all areas of their life. 
 
In short: Edwards’ ethics are built on love or as he puts it in the doctrine of the first sermon 
in Charity and its Fruits, “All that virtue which is saving, and distinguishing of true 
Christians from others, is summed up in Christian or divine love”.110 We must explore now 
what this “Christian love” is in the light of who God is and what it is for him to love. The rest 
of his ethics are corollaries of this locus. Charity and its Fruits discusses humility, patience, 
kindness, and long-suffering as virtues born of Christian love. 
 
What is Love? 
 
Edwards defines love as “that disposition or affection by which one is dear to another”.111 
Edwards distinguishes the love of benevolence and love of complacence. The former 
“respects the good enjoyed or to be enjoyed by the beloved”, the latter “good to be enjoyed in 
the beloved”.112 Love of benevolence is the key part of Christian love since it is the love 
exercised in the grace of God. For Edwards Christian love may be synonymous with divine 
love, a term he uses in two ways: First it may refer first to the love which God extends. 
Second it refers to God’s love as “poured into” the believer's heart (Romans 5:5), the love 
which influences and governs113 the regenerate person to act114 but is alien to an unbeliever 
such as Pharaoh during the time of the Exodus.115 For this reason God’s love is paradigmatic 
for true love in a human agent. 
 
The challenge to this love comes in the form of sin which is, according to Edwards, a 
disordering of loves. Self-love is not opposed to Christian love. For if self-love is defined 
simply as a person’s “love of his own pleasure and happiness, and hatred of his own 
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misery”116 there is no opposition. Christian love does seek its own happiness, the difference 
is that the happiness sought by Christian love is found in a broad consideration of ‘being in 
general’ an ordering of loves to that which is most worthy and excellent. Edwards makes the 
point that self-love, rightly understood, and christian love are not opposed very strongly 
when he argues that a sinner doesn’t have enough self-love since they are not living with the 
knowledge that God is their greatest happiness. It is rather selfishness, or self-love narrowly 
considered that is the foundation of sin.117 
 
The Spirit of God plants a new principle in the Christian who then loves as God loves. This 
Christian love is participation in the divine nature (2 Peter 1.4). 
 
Types of Virtue 
 
All virtues are, for Edwards, outworkings of this true virtue, charity, or love. Sermon twelve 
of Charity and its Fruits teaches that ‘There is a concatenation of the graces of 
Christianity’.118 That is that they ‘are all linked together or united one to another and within 
one another, as the links of a chain; one does, as it were, hang on another from one end of 
the chain to the other, so that if one link be broken, all falls’.119 This close relationship must 
be remembered when separating out discussion of virtues. 
 
With this caveat we will take up distinctions in Edwards thought on the virtues put forward 
by Elizabeth Cochran.120 She divides Edwards discussion into several parts but the most 
important distinction she notes is that between virtues that reflect a virtue in God (Edwards 
also calls these ‘true virtues’) and those that don’t because they presuppose sin (also called 
‘moral excellences’). It should not by now come as a surprise that Edwards sees human 
virtue as reflecting divine virtue. What’s interesting is to see how he deals with virtues that 
seem inherently impossible to find their exemplar in God for even here he applies a 
traditional Christology to ground even these most human of virtues in God. We will take an 
example of each of these in order to apply all that we have seen of Edwards’ approach and to 




We have defined love in general and turn now to love in the human agent in particular. As we 
have already noted, in Edwardsian ethics love, or charity is not a virtue that can be 
understood as one amongst many. The very first sermon of Charity and Its Fruits puts it this 
way, ‘All that virtue which is saving...is summed up in Christian or divine love’.121 Charity is 
the virtue of virtues, the virtue from which all other virtues flow. Charity is the image of 
God’s inner trinitarian love in humanity. God’s eternal disposition to love reproduced in 
creatures. ‘Truly Christian love cannot be distinguished in its principles. All Christian love is 
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one as to its principle’.122 Edwards uses the word ‘principle’ in its original sense as ‘that from 
which something originates or is derived’.123 
 
This principle from which all good actions derive is the Spirit of God. God the Father loves 
God the Son and it is this Spirit which is implanted in the believer and from which flows all 
other virtues. In the Discourse on the Trinity Edwards states that ‘The Holy Spirit is the love 
of the Father and Son for each other’.124 So when a believer receives the Spirit of love for their 
own they are participating in the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4). The creature then loves with the 
very same love that God has for creation.  As such, says Edwards, ‘When God and man are 
loved with a truly Christian love, they are both loved from the same motives’.125 The very 
same motives which God has for loving creation. As such other people are loved either 
because of their likeness to God (as made in the imago Dei) or because they are his children, 
the very reasons which God has for loving his creatures. 
 
We now turn to look at one of the outworkings of charity in the believer’s life. Humility. 
Edwards defines it this way: 
 
'A sense of our own comparative meanness, with a disposition to a behaviour answerable 
thereto'126 
 
This definition is from Edwards’ sermon on humility in Charity and its Fruits where he also 
notes that humility concerns the ‘tendency of charity with respect to good possessed by 
others’.127 We note humility’s relationship to charity, or love. It may be distinguished from, 
but is not ultimately different to, love. An important part of the distinction between love in 
general and love as expressed in humility is that humility is an outworking of love that ‘is no 
attribute of the divine nature’.128 It is this claim, that ‘humility is no attribute of the divine 
nature’, that makes it such an interesting test case in Edwardsian ethics. For how can ethics 
remain thoroughly grounded in God (in order to be absolute and objective) when some 
virtues cannot be attributed to him? Edwards answer is Christological. Humility may not 
truly be attributed to God in his divine nature but it may still be predicated of Christ. For 
being fully man, he was humble before God (Philippians 2:8). In Christ Edwards is able to 
find a divine exemplar even for a virtue that cannot be predicated of the divine nature but is 
truly human. 
 
Even so Edwards further distinguishes two ways in which the understanding of ‘comparative 
meanness’ which characterises humility is to be understood. The first is ‘natural meanness’ 
or ‘littleness’ in which the subject sees how far below God he or she is ontologically. How 
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little his or her knowledge and strength etc. The second is ‘moral meanness’ or ‘sinfulness’ 
wherein the subject sees God’s perfect goodness and his or her own wickedness. Even with a 
two nature Christology we can only find the first kind of meanness since though he became 
man, thus becoming ontologically ‘mean’ before God the Father, he was without sin 
(Hebrews 4:15), and was, therefore, not morally ‘mean’. Thus, there is still a tension here 
(There is still something uniquely human in its acknowledgment of ‘moral meanness’) 
though Christ provides, for Edwards, a divine exemplar for what is a thoroughly ‘human’ 
virtue. 
 
We noted above that Edwards taught that Humility relates to ‘good possessed by others’. As 
such humility is not, for Edwards opposed to pride per se in the sense of being honoured by 
something since one can take pride in what God has done for them (1 Corinthians 1:31). The 
pride that is opposed to humility is ‘an excessively high, opinion of one's own worth or 
importance which gives rise to a feeling or attitude of superiority over others’129 Edwards 
uses pride in this sense as an antonymous term to humility. The pride that is wrong in 
human beings is the pride of comparison. In Edwardsian terms sin is a narrow view on life. It 
is unable to see the excellency of the whole which leads people to compare themselves with 
others within their own limited sphere. This comparison will say something like, “At least 
I’m not as bad as that person” or “I’m quite good compared with x”. This narrow view 
produces a self-deluded view of the severity of sin. In terms of physical health if a person 
were dying no one would claim they were fine simply on the basis that there was someone 
else in the world who was worse off. The pride that comes before a fall (Proverbs 16:18) hides 
from the person the seriousness of their sin because they cannot see themselves within the 
big picture. Edwards wants values to be grounded in God absolutely rather than in self-
centred comparison which is, inevitably, relative. 
 
Christian humility for Edwards then starts when a comparison is made not between one 
agent and another but between the agent and God. He tells us that 'there is no true humility 
without a sense of their meanness before God’. Even Christ displayed humility before the 
majesty of God in heaven. How much more fallen humanity? 
 
Humility thus grounded in one’s understanding of his or her ‘meanness before God’ is 
inextricably linked to our behaviour towards others. In Charity and its Fruits Edwards lists 
seven effects which our meanness before God has on our relationships with other people: 
contentment with one's lot; prevents ostentation; prevents 'assuming' behaviour; prevents 
scornful behaviour; prevents wilful behaviour; willingness to give superiors their due 
(prevents 'leveling' behaviour); and it prevents self-justification. One cannot help, says 
Edwards, but treat people appropriately when one has a right view of oneself. 
 
We can see then how charity (love, or true virtue) plays the central role in all virtue as it 
broadens one’s horizons to place God at the centre. God knows that he is the being of 
ultimate worth. That he deserves glory. A view of the excellency of the whole which is 
communicated to the regenerate person allows them to share in this view. With God’s glory 
as central one is then able to place oneself in correct perspective. To accept one’s place within 
the created order which in turn leads to an adjustment in one’s view of one’s relationship 
with other people. 
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Edwards for Today 
 
At the start of our work we placed Edwards in his enlightenment context. A context which, 
we noted, represents a break more decisive and more profound than even the great break in 
Western Christendom of two centuries before, the Reformation. The enlightenment saw the 
struggle for intellectuals to wrest themselves free from what they saw as archaic 
metaphysical assumptions which were holding them back. Advances in scientific method 
were leading to breakthroughs which gave the age a spirit of optimism for what the 
individual was able to achieve.130 The same optimism could also be found in the realm of 
moral thought.131 In the American context in particular, increasing focus on the self was 
changing the social atmosphere away from the Puritan way of thinking in terms of God’s 
covenant with communities and more towards the individualistic thought representative of 
American thought after the War of Independence. 
 
Standing as he did at the head of these crossroads, Edwards in many ways shows us an 
untraveled road. Doubtless much of what he wrote and taught have continued, but in many 
ways, he provides a glimpse into what could have been. In this, and whether or not we agree 
with him in all or any particular, he provides a useful resource for today. C. S. Lewis once 
commented that for every new book one reads, one should read an old book, since it is the 
old books that challenge unacknowledged assumptions.132 Their errors, says Lewis, are not to 
be feared for they are all too clear, and therefore pose no threat. Edwards can stand in this 
role for us today. Our society has moved on in the three hundred years since he worked, but 
human nature hasn’t. We cannot help but be shaped by all that has gone on in the 
intervening time. By going back to listen to old voices which hold different assumptions and 
make different mistakes can only deepen our understanding about who we are as human 
beings. Even if we believe we took the right path we will better understand why. 
 
After putting Edwards in dialogue with modern philosophy, the Reformed tradition, the 
revival tradition and Orthodox and Catholic traditions, Michael McClymond and Gerald 
McDermott conclude that Edwards may provide a ‘theological bridge’ in contemporary 
ecumenical discussions.133 They boldly claim that ‘his thought may have more linkages and 
more points of reference to various constituencies within Christianity than any other modern 
Christian theologian’134 and, therefore, that ‘If one had to choose one modern thinker-and 
only one-to function as a point of reference for theological interchange and dialogue’ it would 
be Edwards.135 Be that as it may I wish to conclude by seeking to bring Edwards into dialogue 
on the question of the nature of humanity, not only within Christianity, but with the 
prevailing western culture as a whole. I acknowledge that this rather broad claim is wrought 
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with difficulty in that western culture is not a monolithic entity. I seek primarily to place him 
within the ‘prevailing’ or popular perception of the nature of humanity. In so doing I will 
reference popular literature rather than academic. This is entirely appropriate for Edwards 
since his whole life was at the service of ‘ordinary’ people and the majority of even his most 
highbrow writing was at the service of that great form of popular literature: the sermon. 
 
In the 21st century notions of self-identity, self-love, and self-esteem are central ethical 
questions. Western society is increasingly hostile to any notion of being defined by anything 
or anyone other than ourselves. An article in the Huffington Post put it this way: ‘the new 
definition of freedom today is self-determination’.136 That is that one can do whatever one 
chooses irrespective of those around them. Confusion arises, however, in both secular and 
theological literature, through a lack of definition concerning basic terms.137 Edwards’ 
scholasticism taught him careful definition of terms. We can imagine that his first question 
to the ‘freedom’ of self-determination would be, ‘Why do you want to do that?’ 
 
Much Christian teaching today may be defined as theologically subjective, that is it asks, 
‘What God can do ‘for me’?’ To an Edwardsian way of thinking this centring of the human 
subject at the heart of theological reflection leads to shallow thinking. Since it takes the 
human desire as the foundation upon which theology is built, theological subjectivism fails to 
penetrate behind those desires into the ‘why’ of our very desires themselves. Edwards 
assertion that the will is free from coercion led him deeper still, to question the will itself. 
The ‘self-determination’ touted as freedom is, for Edwards, the very bondage of sin. Edwards 
urges us to ask, ‘Why?’ Why do I want what I want? He then prompts us further to ask if 
there is any objective canon outside ourselves by which our very desires themselves might be 
judged. Could it be, Edwards’ thought invites us to ask, that the very things I want could be 
wrong? 
 
Edwards, of course, goes far beyond posing questions. A thoroughgoing Edwardsian 
objectivism provides a solution. An alternative view of the self which grounds identity, and 
ultimately self-worth, not in the self but in God. Much of contemporary psychology, and 
indeed theology, directs people to look within themselves and to strive harder to achieve 
their goals. These ideas ultimately place the success or failure (whatever they might 
ultimately mean) in the individual. The individual becomes judge, jury, and executioner in 
his or her own life. The answer to psychological questions is to accept oneself as one is. Not 
to allow any outsider to pass a value judgement on your choices, or the way you are. 
Edwardsian ethics invites us to value the creature, human or otherwise, not because of any 
internal value but simply because of their ontological status as creature. Rather than stand as 
an oppressive force compelling people to fit a mould does this not rather provide freedom 
from the judgement which results from failure to live up to one’s own ideas of what one 
should be? 
 
One recent article claimed that in 1980 4% of Americans suffered from anxiety related 
mental health problems. Today the figure stands closer to 50%.138 Even allowing for error 
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there is a mental health epidemic in western society. The Mental Health Foundation claim 
that ‘two in three adults face mental health problems’.139 Edwards’ personal struggle with 
‘melancholy’140 means that he provides a window into a life lived and not just theology 
abstractly considered. 
 
A further extension of this line of Edwardsian thought into today’s ethical debates is on the 
question as to whether we are born predisposed to certain behaviours, habits or even sexual 
preferences, or whether these attributes of our self are choices we make. This debate would 
be, for Edwards, a moot point. Our choices are because of what we want and are made 
because of what we perceive the greatest good to be. He would challenge us not to make too 
firm a distinction between the way we are and what we want. 
 
Edwards challenges the way of thinking that what one needs is to love oneself more arguing 
that in fact that is sin as it’s based on love of self and not love to God (WJE 2.249-250). We 
know from our own experience that if we find someone as claiming to love us for no other 
reason than to gain something then we question whether in fact they love us at all. It is the 
same for God. This utilitarian understanding of love leads to the rejection of aspects of God 
which don’t serve us such as his wrath and anger against sin (WJE 2.244). 
 
At the beginning of this work we set out out explore Edwards understanding of the human 
person and to put him in dialogue with broader cultural trends. It has become clear to me 
that Edwards provides stimuli for reflection for the modern person. At the heart of the 
human experience is the interplay of our relationships, our inheritance, and our personal 
desires. Perhaps the question may be boiled down to whether we allow our internal 
experiences to interpret our world (subjectivism) or whether we interpret our internal 
experiences by our worldview (objectivism). Are we to find direction and value from within 
or without ourselves. 
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26/09/2017) 
140 George Marsden. Jonathan Edwards: A Life (London: Yale University Press, 2003) pgs. 103-110; 
127-128 see also further references in the index under ‘depression’. 
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